





































































































































































































































































































































































党（Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza） 第一書記になったゴムウカと、東ドイツ統一社会党


























































































































































ルク（Bismarck, Klaus von）、 雑誌“Stern”編集長ナネン（Nannen, Henri）、クルップ総支配人、労
働組合代表、カトリックとプロテスタントの青年組織代表などが含まれていた。
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Dispute over demarcation between Poland and West Germany
— In relation to the Treaty of Normalization of 1970 —
Katsuhiko MATSUKAWA
Abstract
There is a photograph which was taken on the 7th of December in 1970, during the visit of West
German Kanzler Willy Brandt to Poland. In it he fell on the knees to the monument of Jewish Warsaw
Ghetto Uprising.  Many people know this impressive, unforgettable and noble deed taken by the states-
man.  But few know this photograph was prohibited by the government to be published for the Polish
people to see for more than ten years.  Why did the Communist regime of Poland have to hide this
photo?  This paper discusses the reasons.
Almost three years before the Brandt’s visit, the Polish government began an anti-Semitic campaign
connected with the internal strife of comunists factions.  This canpaign intended to avert people’s atten-
tion from the failure of Socialist planned economy.  The people’s dissatisfaction came up to the surface
when the Government gave an order prohibiting the performance of a play of Mickiewicz, a Jewish
Polish poet and patriot of the era of Polish Division.  Students of Warsaw University and Warsaw
Politechnic strongly protested against the administration.
The revolt of Dockyard workers followed their protest in a bigger scale at the port of Gdansk.  A
strong police mobilization was made to put down this workers’ protest.  The memory of these incidents
came back fresh to the people’s mind when Brandt visited at Wsrsaw.
Gomulka, the leader of the Polish Communist Party, was afraid of the revival of the same situation
as two years before, when he got a report of Brandt’s kneeling down before the monument.  Gomulka’s
suspicion lay in the following question;  to whom Brandt kneel down, to the Jewsh sacrificed by the
Nazis in the war time, or to the Jews expelled from Poland three years ago by Communists?  Gomulka
saw danger here.  So he ordered immediately not to make the photograph open to the public.
Another reason for this order connected with the Communist propaganda, in which they drew up
Western capitalists politicians as malicious, treacherous.  If people should know the fact that one of
Western politician took such a brave and virtuous act, what would the people think?  Actually, Gomulka
himself realized through conversations with Brandt, that his sincerity and integrity would never be
found in socialist politicians.
Gomulka wondered if he should admit to the people their propaganda was not to be trusted.
Confronting the dilemma, he chose to hide the truth.  It was not a solution to the problems he had been
confronting.  A few days after Brandt left Poland, Gomulka lost his position in the wake of the anti-gov-
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ernment of Gdansk workers.  Brandt’s visit of Warsaw and his noble act loosened the foundation of the
Communist regime of Poland.
Keywords :  Poland, Oder-Neisse border, Gomulka, Brandt’s kneeling down, Polish-W.Germany relations
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